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NOTE
NOONTIME DUMPING: WHY STATES HAVE BROAD
DISCRETION TO REGULATE ONBOARD
TREATMENTS OF BALLAST WATER
Kyle H. Landis-Marinello*
Ballast water discharges from shipping vessels are responsible for
spreading numerous forms of aquatic invasive species, a form of
biological pollution that leads to billions of dollars in annual costs.
In the wake of inaction from the federal government and inaction
from the shipping industry, several Great Lakes states are currently
considering legislation to address the problem. Michigan has al-
ready passed a law to prevent ballast water introductions of
invasive species. As states begin to regulate ballast water dis-
charges from oceangoing vessels, such laws will likely face
challenges based on the constitutional principles of the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the federal preemption doctrine of the Su-
premacy Clause. This Note contends that state ballast water laws
do not violate either the Dormant Commerce Clause or the Su-
premacy Clause. States can regulate ballast water discharges
without violating the Dormant Commerce Clause because state
regulations in this area do not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and, even if they did, courts allow discrimination in this
context. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law does not preempt
state regulation of ballast water discharges. Although federal regu-
lation of onboard equipment might impose some limitations on
similar state regulations, federal law does not preempt states from
preapproving certain methods for treating ballast water
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 136
I. STATE BALLAST WATER LAWS Do NOT VIOLATE
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ......................................... 141
* J.D. candidate, May 2008. I would like to thank my Note Editors, Liz Ryan and Andrew
Adams, as well as Kate Drenning, Jim Driscoll-MacEachron, Andrea Loh, Brittany Parling, and Ben
Schweigert, all of whom provided me with extremely helpful comments. I would also like to thank
Andy Buchsbaum and Neil Kagan of the National Wildlife Federation's Great Lakes Natural Re-
source Center, as well as Professors Eric Freyfogle and Noah Hall, for inspiration and feedback
throughout this process. Most of all, I would like to thank my wife Talitha for enduring my busy
work schedule during our first year of marriage and for encouraging me to continue the struggle to
protect the environment.
Michigan Law Review
A. State Ballast Water Laws Do Not Discriminate
Against Interstate Commerce ............................................ 142
1. Facial D iscrimination ................................................. 143
2. Having the Practical Effect of Discriminating ............. 144
B. State Ballast Water Laws Survive the Pike Test
for Incidental Effects on Interstate Commerce .................. 149
C. State Ballast Water Laws Are Justified in
Burdening Interstate Commerce ........................................ 151
1. State Ballast Water Laws Serve a Legitimate
Local P urpose ............................................................. 152
2. The Purpose Behind State Ballast Water
Laws Could Not Be Served as Well by
Nondiscriminatory M eans ........................................... 154
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION ANALYSIS ............................................ 156
A . Explicit Preemption ........................................................... 156
B. Occupation of the Field Preemption .................................. 157
1. Federal Law Does Not Preempt State Ballast
Water Laws that Focus on Discharges ........................ 158
2. Federal Law Preempts State Ballast Water Laws
that Prescribe the Only Type of Onboard
Equipment Ships Can Use ........................................... 161
3. Federal Law Does Not Preempt State Ballast
Water Laws that Specify the Equipment that
is Preapproved Under a General Permit .................... 163
C. Confl ict Preemption .......................................................... 165
1. Impossible to Comply with Both State
and Federal Law ......................................................... 166
2. Frustration of Purposes .............................................. 166
C O N CLU SION ......................................................................................... 167
INTRODUCTION
Imagine someone opening a valve that dumps vast amounts of pollution
into a body of water. Although that may sound like a "midnight dumping"
operation,' these polluters do not hide what they are doing. They do their
dumping in the middle of the day, and no one stops them. To make matters
worse, imagine that this particular type of pollution never goes away. In fact,
rather than breaking down over time, this type of pollution multiplies and
travels long distances to pollute new areas of the body of water. Although
federal and state governments have largely dealt with the problem of mid-
night dumping, they have given relatively little attention to discharges that
happen in broad daylight.
1. For an explanation of "midnight dumping" operations, see Thomas H. Maugh H, Toxic
Waste Disposal a Growing Problem, 204 SCIENCE 819, 819 (1979) (referring to "drums of chemi-
cals of unknown ancestry... dumped into municipal sewers and private wells").
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Every year, shipping vessels discharge billions of gallons of ballast wa-
ter-the water stored in large tanks in the bottom of a cargo ship to keep the
2
ship at the proper weight-into the waters of the United States. Because
cargo ships are designed to travel with heavy loads, these ships can only
maintain their proper balance by taking in ballast water as they unload
cargo.3 The ballast water often travels long distances before a cargo ship
reloads, at which point the ship discharges the ballast water-and any inva-
sive species that have hitched a ride-into the surrounding body of water.
Invasive species pose one of the largest environmental threats that our
waterbodies have ever faced. Once invasive species are introduced into a
body of water, they can multiply and disrupt the entire ecological fabric of
the area.5 The primary reason that invasive species are able to wreak such
widespread destruction is that many of them have no natural predators in the
6invaded area. The delicate balance between predators and prey quickly be-
comes unbalanced in favor of the nonnative species.
Introductions of invasive species have historically had a disproportion-
ately large impact on the Great Lakes. To anyone who resides in one of the
eight Great Lakes states s and keeps abreast of environmental issues, the
mention of zebra mussels or sea lamprey will elicit a fiercely negative reac-
tion.9 And the worst might be yet to come, as the leaping Asian Carp and
other strange science-fiction-like creatures, such as the snakehead fish, ap-
proach waterways that lie on the borders of the Great Lakes. In fact, Asian
carp are already "at the door to the Great Lakes."'0 At a recent conference on
2. E.g., EPA, AQUATIC NUISANCE SPECIES IN BALLAST WATER DISCHARGES: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS 4 (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/invasive-species/ballast-report-attch5.pdf.
3. James T. Carlton & Jonathan B. Geller, Ecological Roulette: The Global Transport of
Nonindigenous Marine Organisms, 261 SCIENCE 78, 79 (1993).
4. Christopher Bright, Invasive Species: Pathogens of Globalization, 116 FOREIGN POL'Y
50, 50 (1999); see also Great Lakes Radio Consortium, Ten Threats to the Great Lakes (Oct. 10,
2005), http://www.glrc.org/topten.php3 (last visited May 15, 2007) (listing invasive species as the
number one threat). Invasive species are sometimes referred to as "biological pollution." The Clean
Water Act explicitly defines "pollutant" as including "biological materials," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)
(2000), which arguably includes invasive species, see Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, No. C 03-05760
SI, 2005 WL 756614, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005). Scholars use the term "biological pollution"
as well. E.g., Bright, supra, at 50. This Note only addresses invasive species as forms of biological
pollution, even though the transportation of invasive species under certain circumstances might also
trigger other laws, such as the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2000).
5. Bright, supra note 4, at 51.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
9. Zebra mussels and sea lamprey are two of the most prominent invasive species in the
Great Lakes, and they have caused widespread damage throughout the region. See, e.g., sources
cited infra note 15.
10. Editorial, Asian carp ban will protect Great Lakes, SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Nov. 7, 2005,
available at http://www.greatlakesdirectory.org/wi/I 10705_great_lakes.htm ("The only thing stand-
ing between the fish-which can grow up to 100 pounds or larger-is an electronic fence near
Chicago that is designed to deliver a non-lethal jolt of electricity .... ). The electronic fence is not
cheap: "At a construction cost of $9 million and an annual expense of $500,000, state and federal
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the Great Lakes, Peter Annin cautioned that "if [Asian carp] get into the Great
Lakes, [it] will change the Great Lakes more than sea lamprey and zebra mus-
sels together."" According to one member of Congress, the Asian carp "could
devastate the Great Lakes' multi-billion dollar fishing industry."'2
Invasive species are extremely costly to the Great Lakes. To put numbers
on the matter, "[t]he most comprehensive estimate of Great Lakes Basin
economic and environmental costs, while [it] is based on a review of other
studies, suggests annual costs of US$5.7 billion, including US$4.5 billion in
damage to commercial and sport fishing."'' 3 Government officials agree that
invasive species cost the Great Lakes region alone as much as five billion
dollars every year.14
Over the last four decades, oceangoing vessels-specifically, cargo ships
carrying ballast water-have been the main pathway for the introduction of
invasive species.' Interestingly, these same oceangoing vessels bring just
under fifty-five million dollars in annual economic benefits. 6 Comparing
these benefits to the costs of invasive species shows that by allowing ocean-
going vessels to ship cargo, society as a whole is arguably spending over
ninety dollars for every dollar it gets back. 7 Thus, from an economic stand-
engineers are electrifying 500 feet of water to prevent the Asian carp from reaching Lake Michigan."
Peter Slevin, It's Asian Carp Against the Current: Authorities Try Shocking Solution To Halt Men-
ace, WASH. POST, May 22, 2005, at A03.
11. Audio file: Peter Annin, Keynote Address at the University of Michigan Law School's
Environmental Law Society Symposium: The Great Lakes: Reflecting the Landscape of Environmental
Law (Sept. 29, 2006), available at http://students.law.umich.edu/avlaw/20060929_GreatLakes_
Symposium/20060929_GreatLakesSymposium_2.WMA (at 1:04:51) (last visited May 16, 2007).
12. Editorial, supra note 10 (quoting Rep. Mark Green (R-Wis.)).
13. JOHN C. TAYLOR & JAMES L. ROACH, OCEAN SHIPPING IN THE GREAT LAKES: TRANS-
PORTATION COST INCREASES THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A CESSATION OF OCEAN VESSEL SHIPPING
64 (2005), available at http://www.gvsu.edu/forms/business/OceanShippingReport09ll05.pdf (cit-
ing David Pimentel, Aquatic Nuisance Species in the New York State Canal and Hudson River
Systems and the Great Lakes Basin: An Economic and Environmental Assessment, 35 ENVTL.
MGrr. 692 (2005)) (emphasis added).
14. E.g., EPA, supra note 2, at 9.
15. Kristen T. Holeck et al., Bridging Troubled Waters: Biological Invasions, Transoceanic
Shipping, and the Laurentian Great Lakes, 54 BIOSCIENCE 919, 920 (2004) ("Since completion of
the St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959, at least 43 [invasive species] have become established in the
Great Lakes, of which 73% have been attributed to the discharge of ballast water by transoceanic
ships." (emphasis added)). The zebra mussel, for example, is by far the most costly invasive species
in the Great Lakes, and its introduction can be traced to ballast water discharges. See, e.g., Ladd E.
Johnson & James T. Carlton, Post-Establishment Spread in Large-Scale Invasions: Dispersal
Mechanisms of the Zebra Mussel Dreissena Polymorpha, 77 ECOLOGY 1686, 1687 (1996).
16. TAYLOR & ROACH, supra note 13, at 1. Taylor and Roach refer to this as the "transporta-
tion cost penalty" of the cessation of all of the shipping services provided by oceangoing vessels in
the Great Lakes. Id. This penalty was measured in terms of the cost of alternative modes of transpor-
tation that could replace oceangoing shipping vessels. Id. Because this information, as well as
information about the cost of invasive species introduced by such vessels, is readily available, Taylor
and Roach were able to complete their study without running into the usual difficulties that occur
when trying to gauge the environmental costs and economic benefits of a polluting activity. For a
general overview of those difficulties, see MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 108-10 (2004).
17. Five billion dollars divided by fifty-five million dollars is $90.91. Granted, oceangoing
vessels are probably not responsible for introducing all of the costly invasive species that have entered
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point, unless this industry can take drastic measures to lower the costs of
dealing with invasive species, society would benefit from the cessation of all
oceangoing shipping in the Great Lakes."
The United States currently has surprisingly few laws that address the
problem of invasive species. Although the federal government has passed
two laws to address ballast water introductions of invasive species,' 9 nei-
ther measure has had much success.' ° Moreover, Congress has done
nothing in the last ten years, despite numerous attempts by environmental
groups and others to pass federal legislation requiring oceangoing vessels
to refrain from discharging untreated ballast water." The shipping industry
has also failed to address this problem effectively, despite being on notice
for many years that it was engaging in a dangerous and costly activity
whenever it discharged ballast water.12 In the wake of inaction from the
federal government and from the shipping industry, several Great Lakes
23
states are currently considering legislation to address the problem, and
the Great Lakes. Thus, it is not fair to attribute the entire five billion dollars in expenses to the shipping
industry. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the ballast water discharges of oceangoing vessels were
responsible for the introduction of zebra mussels and other invasive species that are responsible for the
vast majority of these costs. See generally Johnson & Carlton, supra note 15, at 1687.
18. It is not unrealistic to suggest the cessation of all of the shipping services provided by
oceangoing vessels in the Great Lakes. See TAYLOR & ROACH, supra note 13, at I ("While ... other
modes [of shipping] have some potential capacity constraints, we believe laker and rail capacity
would be able to accommodate the extra volume.").
19. Congress passed the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act
("NANPCA") in 1990, Title I of Pub. L. No. 101-646, 104 Stat. 4761, and amended it in 1996 with
the Nonindigenous Invasive Species Act ("NISA"), Pub. L. No. 104-332, 110 Stat. 4073 (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4751 (2000)).
20. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, TWELFTH BIENNIAL REPORT ON GREAT
LAKES WATER QUALITY 15 (2004), available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/12br/
englishlreport/index.html ("While [federal and other] initiatives are encouraging ..., the flow of
new invasive species to the Great Lakes has not been stopped."); INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMIS-
SION, ELEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 33 (2002), available at
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/llbr/english/report/index.html (noting that federal meas-
ures have not been entirely effective). Federally required open-ocean ballast water exchanges are
ineffective because they often result in an "incomplete discharge of water and sediments," and, as a
result, invasive species remain in the tanks throughout the process. Fangzhu Zhang & Mike
Dickman, Mid-ocean exchange of container vessel ballast water, 176 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS
SERIES 243, 250 (1999), available at http://www.int-res.com/articles/meps/176/m 176p243.pdf.
21. At least five bills have been introduced in recent years, and Congress has yet to act on
any of them. See National Aquatic Invasive Species Act, S. 725, 110th Cong. (2007); Great Lakes
Invasive Species Control Act, H.R. 801, 110th Cong. (2007); Prevention of the Aquatic Invasive
Species Act, H.R. 5030, 109th Cong. (2006); Ballast Water Management Act, S. 363, 109th Cong.
(2005); National Aquatic Invasive Species Act, H.R. 1591, 109th Cong. (2005).
22. In this sense, the position of the shipping industry is remarkably similar to the position
taken by manufacturers of the ozone-depleting cholorfluorocarbons ("CFCs"), who expected people
to accept ozone depletion as a side effect of refrigeration. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PARSON, PROTECT-
ING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND STRATEGY 60 (2003).
23. E.g., S. File No. 53, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); S.B. 119, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wis. 2007). Both of these proposed bills are similar in structure to the Michigan statute described
infra notes 24, 26-27 and accompanying text.
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Michigan has already passed a law to prevent ballast water introductions
24
of invasive species.
When a state decides to regulate ballast water discharges, it has several
options. It might choose to ban these discharges altogether. In light of the
enormous threat that invasive species pose to the Great Lakes,25 it would not
be surprising if one or more of the eight states bordering on these treasured
waterways decided to impose such a ban. Nevertheless, given the general
reluctance of most state legislatures to take what some would consider dras-
tic measures when a more moderate approach is readily available, it is more
likely that states will choose (as Michigan did) to ban the discharge of un-
26treated ballast water. The shippers can then continue to go about their
business as usual, so long as they treat the ballast water before discharging
it. Accordingly, Michigan's state ballast water law provides the following:
Beginning January 1, 2007, all oceangoing vessels engaging in port
operations in this state shall obtain a permit from the [D]epartment [of Envi-
ronmental Quality]. The department shall issue a permit for an oceangoing
vessel only if the applicant can demonstrate that the oceangoing vessel will
not discharge aquatic nuisance species or if the oceangoing vessel discharges
ballast water or other waste or waste effluent, that the operator of the vessel
will utilize environmentally sound technology and methods, as determined
by the department, that can be used to prevent the discharge of aquatic nui-
sance species."
In response to this legislation, Michigan's Department of Environmental
Quality recently approved a "General Permit" that allows shippers to use any
one of four separate methods of treating ballast water. 8 Ultraviolet radiation
and deoxygenation are two of the approved treatment methods.2 ' The other
two approved methods are biocide treatments-one involving hypochlorite,
and the other involving chlorine dioxide.30 Other Great Lakes states are likely
to follow Michigan's model and ban the discharge of untreated ballast water,
although the precise treatment methods in each state may differ.'
24. 2005-3 Mich. Adv. Legis. Serv. 98 (codified in scattered sections of MICH. CoMI'. LAWS.
SERV. § 324 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)); 2005-3 Mich. Adv. Legis. Serv. 99 (LexisNexis) (codified in
scattered sections of MICH. COMp. LAWS SERV. § 324 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006)).
25. See supra notes 2-18 and accompanying text.
26. See MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
27. Id.
28. MICH. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PERMIT No. MIGI40000: BALLAST WATER CONTROL
GENERAL PERMIT: PORT OPERATIONS AND BALLAST WATER DISCHARGE (Oct. 11, 2006), available
at http://www.deq.state.nmi.us/documents/deq-water-npdes-generalpermit-MIG140000.pdf [hereinafter
GENERAL PERMIT]. A General Permit is essentially a preapproved permit for all those that meet its re-
quirements. It is an agency's way of fast tracking the permitting process. Significantly, the existence of
an agency-approved General Permit does not preclude potential permittees from applying for individual
permits. GENERAL PERMIT, supra, at 2.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id.
31. For a discussion of the ramifications (or lack thereof) of different states choosing to
preapprove different treatment methods, see infra Section II.B. Because Michigan's statutes and
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As states begin to regulate ballast water discharges from oceangoing
vessels, such laws will likely face challenges based on the constitutional
principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause and the federal preemption
doctrine of the Supremacy Clause. In fact, representatives of the shipping
industry and port authorities have already raised both of these claims in an
32
effort to strike down Michigan's recently passed state ballast water laws.
This Note contends that state ballast water laws do not violate either the
Dormant Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause.
Part I argues that states can regulate ballast water discharges without
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause because state regulations in this
area do not discriminate against interstate commerce, and, even if they did,
courts allow discrimination in this context. Part II explains that although
federal law might preempt some state regulations of ballast water dis-
charges, federal law does not preempt state regulations that preapprove
certain methods for treating ballast water.
I. STATE BALLAST WATER LAWS Do NOT VIOLATE
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the sev-
eral States."33 To give full meaning to this positive grant of power, courts have
interpreted the Commerce Clause to include a "negative" or "dormant" aspect
"that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or bur-
den the interstate flow of articles of commerce." 34 Courts have employed a
regulations provide a model for other Great Lakes states, the analysis in this Note uses the term
"state ballast water laws" to refer to state statutes and regulations similar to those currently in force
in Michigan.
32. Complaint at 8-9, Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 15, 2007). At the time that this complaint was filed (March 15, 2007), much of this Note had
already been completed, and an earlier version of this Note was posted to the Social Science Re-
search Network on May 8, 2007. Just before this Note was published, Judge Feikens issued an
opinion dismissing the shipping industry's lawsuit for some of the same reasons discussed through-
out this Note. See Fednav, Ltd., 2007 WL 2336072 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
34. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994). This Note as-
sumes that Congress has not affirmatively granted states the power to regulate in this area. If
Congress were to make such a grant, it would "authorize the States to engage in regulation that the
Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). One federal
district court has held that the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1387 (2000) ("CWA"), is such a
grant because it bans the discharging of any pollutant into a navigable waterway without a permit,
§ 1311 (a), and it gives states the authority to implement-and augment-these laws, § 1313. Nw.
Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, No. C 03-05760 SI, 2005 WL 756614, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005)
(striking down an EPA rule, 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a), exempting ballast water discharges from the
Clean Water Act); accord Liwen A. Mah, In Brief, EPA Cannot Exempt Discharges of Ballast Water
from the Clean Water Act's Permit Requirements, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 757, 757 (2005) ("Strongly
repudiating an [EPA] interpretation of the [CWA], a federal district court held that releases of ballast
water are subject to the CWA. As a result, ships cannot discharge ballast water into U.S. waterways
without first obtaining permits... ). The Northwest Environmental Advocates court recognized the
"unambiguously expressed intent of Congress" that states regulate ballast water discharges under
the CWA's permitting program and held that the EPA's rule was "in excess of its statutory authority."
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two-tiered test for determining whether the Dormant Commerce Clause has
been violated.35 The first step is to determine whether the state law discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce.3 6 Nondiscriminatory state laws, which
merely have incidental effects on interstate commerce, "will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits."37 Discriminatory state laws call for "more
demanding scrutiny" whereby "the burden falls on the State to demonstrate
both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means."38
This Part argues that state ballast water laws do not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Section L.A contends that these laws do not discriminate
against interstate commerce and instead have only incidental effects on it.
Section I.B argues that the burden of these incidental effects is not clearly
excessive in relation to the benefits of such laws. Section I.C maintains that
even if there were discrimination, it would be justified in this context be-
cause state ballast water laws serve a legitimate purpose that could not be
served by nondiscriminatory means.
A. State Ballast Water Laws Do Not Discriminate
Against Interstate Commerce
According to the Supreme Court, "the first step in analyzing any law
subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to de-
termine whether it 'regulates evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.' ,39 To
guide this analysis, the Sixth Circuit has noted that "a 'statute can discrimi-
nate against out-of-state interests in three different ways: (a) facially,
(b) purposefully, or (c) in practical effect.' "40 Realistically, state ballast wa-
ter laws are unlikely to have any purpose other than to protect a state's
Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 2005 WL 756614, at *13; cf Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139 (quoting S.-Cent. Tim-
ber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984)) (requiring this type of "unmistakably clear"
congressional intent to allow states to regulate in an area otherwise forbidden by the Dormant
Commerce Clause). Nevertheless, because the EPA has appealed the Northwest Environmental
Advocates ruling, and because the current EPA rule remains in effect until September 30, 2008, Nw.
Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, No. C 03-05760 SI, 2006 WL 2669042, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2006),
this Note's analysis does not rely on the Northwest Environmental Advocates court's well-reasoned
interpretation of the CWA.
35. See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99. For a discussion of how this two-tiered tLst also ap-
plies to state laws that "burden" actual transportation networks (such as waterway shipping), see
infra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
36. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
37. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v. De-
troit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
38. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
39. Or Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (citation omitted).
40. LensCrafters, Inc. v. Robinson, 403 F.3d 798, 802 (2005) (citation omitted).
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waters from invasive species.4' Such a purpose does not discriminate against
out-of-state interests. Although challengers of state ballast water laws might
claim that they are facially discriminatory or discriminatory in practical ef-
fect, those arguments are also ultimately unpersuasive.
Regardless of what type of discrimination is at issue, courts have primar-
ily invoked the Dormant Commerce Clause as a check on state parochialism.42
The overriding concern is that each state government will enact laws that
benefit its respective constituents, even if these laws act at the expense of out-
of-staters and the nation as a whole.43 An in-depth look at state ballast water
laws reveals that these are not the type of parochial laws which give prefer-
ence to in-state goods. Rather, the regulating state's own residents bear most
of the costs of such laws." Also, by forcing the shipping industry to take cost-
effective measures (from a societal point of view),45 state ballast water laws
create an overall benefit for the nation as a whole and are therefore unlikely to
be struck down under traditional Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.46
1. Facial Discrimination
Although state ballast water laws might distinguish between oceangoing
and nonoceangoing vessels,47 this distinction is insufficient to anchor a claim
that such laws are facially discriminatory. Facial discrimination usually in-
volves state laws that focus solely on whether something is generated in-state
or out-of-state.48 The distinction between oceangoing and nonoceangoing ves-
sels does not focus on state borders. The Michigan legislature, for instance,
defines "oceangoing vessel" as "a vessel that operates on the Great Lakes or
the St. Lawrence waterway after operating in waters outside of the Great
Lakes or the St. Lawrence waterway.' 49 Because the Great Lakes and the St.
Lawrence waterway border a number of states besides Michigan, this type of
statute on its face draws no distinction between in-state and out-of-state ships.
41. See infra Section I.C. I for an explanation of why state ballast water laws are free of any
pretextual effort to bolster in-state interests at the expense of out-of-staters.
42. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yester-
day's Rationality Review Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457, 481 (2004) ("[Dlormant
Commerce Clause cases involve a faction in one state using their own government to deprive out-of-
state traders of economic opportunity."). For a thorough analysis of when courts use the Dormant
Commerce Clause to strike down state laws, see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
43. See Sandefur, supra note 42, at 481.
44. See the discussion infra text accompanying notes 56-58 for the argument that, if any-
thing, state ballast water laws discriminate against the regulating state's own businesses by making
it more difficult for them to export goods.
45. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Section I.B.
47. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3112(6) (LexisNexis 2006).
48. E.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994); Chem.
Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
618 (1978).
49. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 324.3101(p) (LexisNexis 2006).
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Further, the distinction between oceangoing vessels and nonoceangoing
vessels is not a proxy for distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state in-
terests. Rather, the distinction is the only rational way to limit regulation to
those vessels that threaten to bring nonnative invasive species to the waters of
the regulating state. The distinction focuses on what ships do-whether they
operate in waters that contain nonnative species-rather than on a ship's state
of origin. After all, ships that operate only within the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence waterway (and are therefore nonoceangoing vessels) cannot intro-
duce nonnative species to this area. Finally, these regulations equally burden
any Michigan-based ships that operate outside the Great Lakes or the St. Law-
rence waterway, and the regulations do not apply to out-of-state ships that
only travel within the Great Lakes or the St. Lawrence waterway.5 0
2. Having the Practical Effect of Discriminating
State ballast water laws do not have the "practical effect"'" of discriminat-
ing against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has noted that
"'discrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."52 The
Court appears to be worried only about laws that a state passes to benefit its
own producers at the expense of out-of-state producers.53 Thus, a state is theo-
retically free to pass a law that harms its own residents and benefits out-of-
staters, because, even if such a law affects interstate commerce, it does not
"discriminate[] against interstate commerce"
54
State ballast water laws do not benefit in-state producers at the expense of
out-of-state interests. If state ballast water laws dissuaded out-of-state produc-
ers from shipping goods to the regulating state, effectively creating a
preference for in-state goods, this would almost certainly discriminate against
interstate commerce.55 But state ballast water laws only present hurdles for the
50. For these reasons, the Fednav court recently held that Michigan's laws do not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce. Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072, at * 12
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007). Further, the Supreme Court has sometimes found it immaterial that the
state laws in question also discriminated against in-state interests. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992); Dean's Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (1951). These cases involved local or state laws with suspiciously protectionist
motives. For instance, in Dean's Milk Co., the Court explicitly stated that the law in question was
"an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State."
Dean's Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 354. In this sense, the laws struck down in these cases are easily dis-
tinguishable from state ballast water laws, which are not motivated by protectionism. See supra text
accompanying note 44; infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
51. E.g., LensCrafters, Inc. v. Robinson, 403 F.3d 798, 803 (6th Cir. 2005).
52. Or Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added).
53. Although the term "economic interests" is ambiguous and could be read to refer to con-
sumers, the Oregon Waste Systems Court likely meant for the term to refer to producers, since
industrial interests usually represent the primary economic interests of the state. For instance, the
state laws at issue in the seminal Dormant Commerce Clause case Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 138 (1970), in effect sought to shift the business of cantaloupe packing and processing
from out-of-state industries to in-state industries.
54. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., id. (striking down a state law that "favors shippers of [in-state] waste over their
counterparts handling waste generated in other States"). Although the Oregon Waste Systems Court
struck down the state law, it did so only after finding that the state law had no justification for its
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regulating state's own exporters. The reason is that vessels only discharge bal-
last water when they are loading cargo, not when they are unloading it.56 To
maintain the proper balance, the amount of ballast water on a ship is inversely
proportional to the amount of cargo on the ship. The typical ballast water dis-
charge occurs when a ship that has no cargo (and therefore has the maximum
amount of ballast water) enters a port. That full load of ballast water is then
discharged as the ship loads its cargo:

















discrimination. See id. at 100-08. In other words, it does not end the matter when a court finds that a
state law discriminates against interstate commerce. Rather, as described infra Section I.C, courts
will uphold a state law that discriminates against interstate commerce whenever a state can show
that the law "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." Or Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101 (citations omitted). States can make
that showing in the case of ballast water laws, for the reasons described infra Section I.C.
56. E.g., Carlton & Geller, supra note 3, at 79.
57. See Global Ballast Water Management Programme-The Problem, http://globallast.imo.
org/index.asp?page=problem.htm&menu=true (last visited May 12, 2007).
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In this typical scenario, ballast water laws only affect ships that arrive
without cargo (meaning without any out-of-state goods). Ships that arrive
fully loaded-those that are bringing out-of-state goods to the regulating
state-are not carrying ballast water. As they unload their cargo, they either
need to reload the ship with new cargo or take in ballast water, but they do
not need to discharge anything. As a result, they are not subject to ballast
water regulations."
Although ballast water regulations could arguably affect out-of-state im-
ports into the regulating state-for instance, if shippers decided to avoid
ports where they could not load cargo 9-this argument is ultimately unper-
suasive. As an initial matter, it is incorrect to say that shippers could not
load cargo at all,.because state ballast water laws are only an impediment to
loading a larger amount of cargo than what is unloaded. Even if a ship ar-
rives with less than a full load, it can still load an equal amount of cargo
without discharging any ballast water, so long as the loading and unloading
happen at roughly the same time and thereby keep the ship balanced. 60 In
58. This assumes that the regulating state has decided to regulate the actual discharging of
ballast water. Although Michigan's General Permit also applies to oceangoing vessels that "engage
in port operations in Michigan and do not discharge ballast water into the waters of the state," GEN-
ERAL PERMIT, supra note 28, at 1, such vessels are only subject to a minimal amount of regulation-
namely, notification and reporting requirements to ensure that they do not actually discharge any
ballast water, id. at 3. This minimal regulation can hardly be seen as a burden on interstate com-
merce and therefore should not affect the analysis. See Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007
WL 2336072, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007) (finding that the burden on ships without any
ballast "is de minimis").
59. One possibility is that a ship might want to carry a half load of goods to a regulating
state's port and then reload the ship with a full load of goods, thereby discharging all of the ballast
water that kept the ship at the right weight when it was only half-loaded. Again, there would be no
problem if the ship arrived fully loaded, but, because it is only half-loaded, it needs to discharge
ballast water when it swaps its half load for a full load. If ballast water regulations prevent this ship
from loading goods at the regulating state's port, then, according to this argument, this ship might
decide to avoid this trip altogether.
60. This type of coordination is possible. See, e.g., Transport Desgagnfs, Inc., Technical
Data o" the MIT Vdga Desgagnds (Feb. 5, 2003), http://www.groupedesgagnes.com/en/upload/
vegaang-final Ill.pdf (listing features that include the "[s]imultaneous loading and unloading of
four grades of cargo"). The ability to load and unload cargo simultaneously without discharging
ballast water rebuts recent arguments by representatives of the shipping industry who claim that if a
ship must retain its ballast water, Michigan's laws would "effectively preclud[e] any loading of
cargo in Michigan." Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Their Com-
plaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to Prevent Defendants from Enforcing the Michigan
Ballast Water Statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.3112(6) at 11, Fednav, Ltd., 2007 WL 2336072
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Brief]. Further, society benefits from forcing the ship-
ping industry to find ways to eliminate the transportation of ballast water because ballast water
represents an inefficiency-namely, unutilized cargo carrying capacity. The trucking industry real-
ized this long ago and developed cooperative networks and sophisticated planning systems to
minimize the number of times a tractor-trailer truck had to travel without cargo. For a discussion of
how the trucking industry uses dispatchers and, more recently, computer software programs to
maximize "backhauls" (meaning returning with cargo rather than with an empty load), see Thomas
N. Hubbard, Information, Decisions, and Productivity: Onboard Computers and Capacity Utiliza-
tion in Trucking, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1328, 1330 (2003) ("[Sihippers themselves [in the trucking
industry] search for other shippers with complementary demands. For example, a shipper with one-
way demands between Chicago and St. Louis will search for a shipper with one-way demands be-
tween St. Louis and Chicago."). As a result of these efforts, one rarely sees a tractor-trailer truck
traveling without cargo in tow. If state ballast water laws force the shipping industry to plan routes
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reality, state ballast water laws are not an impediment to importing goods; if
anything, these laws encourage the shipping industry to bring larger loads
of imports into the regulating state.6'
Other courts have formulated slightly different standards for determining
whether a state law has the practical effect of discriminating, but under these
standards, too, state ballast water laws do not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 62 For instance, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, the
Supreme Court recognized that discrimination against interstate commerce
can be found whenever a state "tax[es] a transaction or incident more heav-
ily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State."'
Because state ballast water laws place disproportionately large burdens on
"oceangoing vessels,'" most of which cross state lines on a regular basis,
these laws seem to fall under the Chemical Waste Management definition of
discrimination.6' Nevertheless, Chemical Waste Management involved state
taxes that directly increased the tax revenue of the regulating state in a way
that benefited in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests; those
laws effectively forced out-of-state interests to subsidize in-state interests. 66
that maximize the use of cargo carrying capacities and avoid the use of ballast water, such laws
would eliminate this inefficiency and could thereby potentially lead to an increase in profits for the
shipping industry.
61. Even if larger loads delay the arrival times of imports, the benefits of rapid delivery are
unlikely to justify sending two half loads of cargo instead of one full load. Further, the trucking
industry has shown that proper coordination can allow for the delivery of full loads with little, if any,
delay. See Hubbard, supra note 60.
62. For an interesting discussion of other definitions of "discrimination" in Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, see Jennifer L. Larsen, Student Article, Discrimination in the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REv. 844 (2004).
63. 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992) (citing Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984)).
64. Michigan's laws in fact apply only to "oceangoing vessels." MICH. CoMP. LAWS SERV.
§ 324.3112(6) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
65. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 342.
66. The laws at issue in Chemical Waste Management were particularly suspicious because
they in effect regulated only out-of-state interests. Id. at 343 ("[O]nly rhetoric, and not explanation,
emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous waste .... ). If that is why the Su-
preme Court struck down those laws, state ballast water laws should easily survive such an analysis.
Granted, with respect to the actual ships that are subject to state ballast water laws, most of the
burdens are placed on ships from other states. As an empirical matter, at any given port, ships that
have already traveled from another state are more likely to be oceangoing vessels and therefore
subject to state ballast water laws. (Indeed, when the shipping industry and port authorities recently
filed a lawsuit against Michigan to enjoin the implementation of Michigan's ballast water laws, the
complaint alleged that "the only entities affected by the Ballast Water Statute are non-Michigan
registered ships; and, therefore, the Ballast Water Statute has a discriminatory effect." Complaint at
8, Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007)). Neverthe-
less, particular ships are just one subset of the interests affected by state ballast water laws, and
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis requires a broader inquiry into all of the affected interests:
"The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate companies does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
A broader view reveals that state ballast water laws place the largest limitations on the regulating
state's own industries, and that these laws place no limitations on out-of-state industries that wish to
ship their goods to the regulating state. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. As noted earlier,
the only caveat is that these ships might be subject to minimal notification and reporting require-
ments, but that should not affect the analysis. See supra note 58. Another possible inquiry is to look
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Because state ballast water laws do not create any such subsidy or directly
increase the revenue of the regulating state,67 they are not nearly as vulner-
able to these types of challenges. Rather, the effects of state ballast water
laws are the exact opposite of those effects that the Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally found to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.6 s
Another argument for finding a practical effect of discrimination suffi-
cient to invoke the Dormant Commerce Clause is that these laws may have
the effect of forcing nonregulating states to bear the burden of invasive spe-
cies. For example, as long as Michigan is the only Great Lakes state with
laws imposing barriers on the discharge of ballast water, shippers may avoid
Michigan's ports. Ports in states like Ohio might then be subject to addi-
tional discharges of untreated ballast water containing invasive species. As a
result, Michigan is, in a way, exporting future invasive scenarios from its
own waters to the waters of nearby states. These types of laws could thereby
be said to protect the regulating state's own water resources at the expense
of the water resources of other states. The Oregon Waste Systems Court
noted that the Dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from engaging in
"resource protectionism. ' 69 The Court stated that "'[n]o State may attempt
to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising bar-
riers to the free flow of interstate trade.' ,70 Invasive species undoubtedly
constitute a problem that is shared by all of the Great Lakes states, and
Michigan's laws could be seen as an attempt by Michigan to isolate itself
from this problem.
The resource protectionism argument is ultimately unpersuasive for at
least three reasons. First, because many invasive species spread far from
their point of introduction, Michigan's ballast water laws do not shift the
burden of dealing with invasive species to other states. If anything,
Michigan's laws will likely have collateral benefits that help lessen the bur-
den on other states by encouraging shippers to find ways to prevent the
at whether these laws in effect create a preference for intrastate shipping. This inquiry correctly
assumes that oceangoing vessels generally engage in interstate-as opposed to intrastate-shipping.
Thus, state ballast water laws in effect burden interstate commerce more than intrastate commerce
and thereby seem to create a preference for the latter. Nevertheless, because these laws do not im-
pede the importation of goods, see supra text accompanying notes 55-58, the only harm to interstate
commerce is in the form of placing barriers to the regulating state's exportation of goods. Although
the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that place barriers on exports, see, e.g., H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (focusing on the need for producers to have "free
access to every market in the Nation"), those decisions are easily distinguishable because they generally
involved both facial discrimination and blatantly improper state motives, see, e.g., id. at 525-45;
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
67. Indeed, these laws are more likely to decrease the revenue of the state by harming the
ability of in-state industries to export their goods. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. Al-
though some of those revenue losses might be offset by savings in the clean-up costs of dealing with
invasive species, the point here is that state ballast water laws do not force out-of-state interests to
subsidize in-state interests.
68. Compare supra text accompanying notes 55-58 (explaining why state ballast water laws
present obstacles for local industries) with H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531
(1949) (invalidating a state law because it served "solely" local economic industrial interests).
69. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 107 (1994).
70. Id. (quoting Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 339-40).
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discharge of invasive species into the Great Lakes in general. Second, even
if Michigan were engaging in a form of resource protectionism, the Su-
preme Court has expressed a willingness to allow a degree of resource
protectionism when the resource being protected is water, which "unlike
other natural resources, is essential for human survival.,'7 The special status
of water helps explain why states still have laws that place strict limits (such
as requiring a permit) on water exported to other states.7' Third, state control
over water resources similarly receives special recognition under federal
law-specifically, the Clean Water Act ("CWA") might empower states to
regulate discharges into state waters.73
B. State Ballast Water Laws Survive the Pike Test for
Incidental Effects on Interstate Commerce
Because state ballast water laws do not discriminate against interstate
commerce, their incidental effects on interstate commerce trigger the test
that the Supreme Court outlined in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.7 4 Under the
Pike test, these laws "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 75
Such burdens are measured in terms of societal costs, which include nega-
tive effects on actual transportation networks for the flow of goods.76
State ballast water laws should be able to survive the Pike test because
they do not clearly impose societal costs that outweigh the putative benefits
of preventing invasive species from entering the regulating state's ports.77 As
mentioned earlier, in the Great Lakes, even the costs of shutting down all
71. Id. (quoting Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,952 (1982)).
72. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (2006). But see Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58
(striking down a Nebraska reciprocity requirement that effectively acted as a complete ban on the
exportation of groundwater to Colorado). Before Sporhase, Colorado prohibited the exportation of
groundwater. Richard S. Harnsberger et al., Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options After Sporhase,
70 NEB. L. REV. 754, 848 (1991) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-136 (repealed 1983)). After
Sporhase, Colorado amended its laws by repealing the all-out prohibition of section 37-90-136 and
replacing it with section 37-81-101, which places severe restrictions on out-of-state transfers; those
restrictions are still "extant." Id.
73. See supra note 34 for an explanation of how states might be able to regulate ballast water
discharges under the Clean Water Act.
74. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
75. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
76. The Oregon Waste Systems Court stated that the Dormant Commerce Clause "denies the
States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of
commerce." Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added). Although courts usually do not
address the "or burden" part of this definition, and, indeed, the Oregon Waste Systems Court itself
focused only on whether the state law in question discriminated against interstate commerce, see
supra text accompanying note 36, this Section includes an exploration of the extent to which bur-
dening actual transportation networks might affect the Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see
infra text accompanying notes 81-87.
77. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. The Fednav court did not analyze
whether Michigan's ballast water laws survive the Pike test when looking at how these laws affect
ships that discharge ballast water. See Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072, at
*14 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).
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oceangoing commerce (roughly fifty-five million dollars per year) are far
outweighed by the putative benefits of avoiding the costs associated with
dealing with invasive species (roughly five billion dollars per year).7 Be-
cause oceangoing commerce in the Great Lakes currently does more
economic harm than good,79 any burden on this commerce (even a law that
required oceangoing vessels to stop shipping altogether in the Great Lakes)
would be outweighed by the benefit of stopping the introduction of invasive
species."'
Because incidental effects on an actual means of transportation might be
said to "burden" interstate travel even if not discriminatory, more difficult
questions arise,' but these concerns are ultimately not enough to invalidate
state ballast water laws. Professor Don Regan has noted that courts might be
doing more than fighting economic protectionism when a case involves the
actual means of interstate transportation (meaning physical modes of trans-
112portation, such as waterway shipping). This theory would presumably
apply to state ballast water laws, since they involve interstate shipping,
which is clearly a means of transporting cargo across state lines. Neverthe-
less, even in many of the cases involving transportation networks, courts
78. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. Even if we assume that invasive species
cost less than five billion dollars per year, it is inconceivable that the cost would be less than fifty-
five million dollars per year. Further, representatives of the shipping industry cannot read the word
"putative" out of the Pike test by arguing that state ballast water laws might not succeed in prevent-
ing future introductions of invasive species. See Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Brief at 11, Fednav,
Ltd., No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072. A state need only show that its ballast water laws aim to
prevent future invasive scenarios. Cf Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 448
(1978) (striking down a law that "failed to make even a colorable showing that its regulations con-
tribute to highway safety" (emphasis added)). States can easily make a "colorable showing" that
ballast water laws will "contribute" to the prevention of invasive species. Further, the state laws at
issue in Raymond were part of an overall regulatory scheme that was enacted to "primarily benefit"
in-state industries. Id. at 447. Because state ballast water laws do not primarily benefit in-state in-
dustries, see supra Section I.A.2; infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text, Raymond is arguably
inapplicable.
79. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
80. Indeed, under these circumstances, it would be an affront to the underlying principles of
the Dormant Commerce Clause for a court to strike down a state ballast water law on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds. After all, state ballast water laws correct a market failure-namely, the
shipping industry's failure to internalize the costs it imposes on society by introducing invasive
species into public water bodies. See generally Mollie Lee, Note, Environmental Economics: A
Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE LJ. 456, 477-82 (2006) (explaining
why environmental harm represents a market failure). By correcting this market failure, these laws
create an overall societal economic benefit that far outweighs any harm. See supra notes 13-18 and
accompanying text. This overall societal economic benefit is precisely the opposite of what the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause traditionally aims at-namely, parochial state laws that harm national welfare.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; see also Thomas K. Anson & P.M. Shenkkan, Observa-
tion, Federalism, The Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71,
76 (1980) ("The Court historically has sought to ensure that, when a state intervenes in the market-
place ... it does so without unduly subverting economic efficiency, viewed on a national scale.")
Professor Paul McGreal has gone further and argued that "harm[ing] the efficiency of the national
economy" should be a prerequisite to the striking down of a state law on Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. Paul E. Mcgreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191, 1201 (1998).
81. See supra note 76.
82. Regan, supra note 42, at 1182-85.
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• • 83have been primarily concerned with fighting state economic protectionism.
For the reasons already mentioned, state ballast water laws are not incidents
of economic protectionism. Indeed, unlike parochialism, state ballast water
laws create an overall benefit for society that far outweighs any costs asso-
ciated with the laws. 85 These laws should therefore survive even a more
probing inquiry into their validity. As Professor Paul McGreal has noted,
"states should be allowed to regulate interstate commerce, even to the extent
of blocking the flow of goods or services across their border, when doing so
does not harm the welfare of the national economy.'8 6 State ballast water
laws do not harm the national economy; rather, such laws should bring
87
enormous benefits to the national economy.
C. State Ballast Water Laws Are Justified in
Burdening Interstate Commerce
Even if state ballast water laws discriminated against or burden interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has held that discrimination against nonna-
tive species to conserve native species is justifiable. 8 In Maine v. Taylor, the
Court noted that although discriminatory state laws trigger the strictest scru-
tiny, they can still survive by demonstrating "both that the statute 'serves a
legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose could not be served as well
by available nondiscriminatory means." State ballast water laws meet both
of those criteria and, therefore, do not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause.90
83. Id. at 1183.
84. See supra Section I.A.2.
85. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
86. McGreal, supra note 80, at 1222.
87. See supra notes 13-18, 60 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying
notes 205-208.
88. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986). Taylor was a nearly unanimous opinion
upholding a Maine statute banning the importation of live baitfish, even though "Maine's import ban
discriminates on its face against interstate trade." Id. at 138. In many ways, Taylor was foreshad-
owed by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). Although the Hughes Court ultimately struck
down a state statute that banned the exportation of minnows in an "overtly discriminat[ory]" way, id.
at 338, it recognized the validity of nonprotectionist efforts to conserve natural resources:
The State's interest in maintaining the ecological balance in state waters by avoiding the re-
moval of inordinate numbers of minnows may well qualify as a legitimate local purpose. We
consider the States' interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate local
purposes similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.
Id. at 337 (emphasis added); accord id. at 338-39 (referring to "protect[ing] and conserv[ing] wild
animal life" as a "legitimate [local] purpose").
89. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (quoting Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).
90. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005)
(noting that the Supreme Court has "found unconstitutional state regulations that unjustifiably dis-
criminate on their face against out-of-state entities" (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978)) (emphasis added)).
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1. State Ballast Water Laws Serve a Legitimate Local Purpose
Even if state ballast water laws discriminated against interstate com-
merce, they serve a legitimate local purpose. 9' Taylor is directly on point
because that case also dealt with the threat that nonnative species pose to
92
native species. The state statute at issue in Taylor forbade the importation
of live baitfish; Maine justified this statute by "arguing that the ban legiti-
mately protects the State's fisheries from parasites and nonnative species
that might be included in shipments of live baitfish. 93 The Court noted ex-
pert testimony that "normative species inadvertently included in shipments
of live baitfish could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology to an unpredictable
extent by competing with native fish for food or habitat, by preying on na-
tive species, or by disrupting the environment in more subtle ways.' '94
Nonnative baitfish also carried parasites that were "not common" to native
fish.95
The Taylor Court held that states can take measures to prevent the im-
portation of potentially harmful normative species even when it is unclear
whether any threat is posed:
[T]he constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause cannot be
read as requiring the State of Maine to sit idly by and wait until potentially
irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the scientific
community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not dangerous be-
fore it acts to avoid such consequences.%
The Court held that even if the environmental risks of nonnative species
"may ultimately prove to be negligible," Maine had "a legitimate interest in
guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks.' '97 Because
nonnative species presented unique threats to native species, Maine's statute
was "not a case of arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the
record suggests that Maine has legitimate reasons, 'apart from their origin,
to treat [out-of-state] baitfish differently.' ,98
91. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (recognizing the protection of native species as a "legiti-
mate local purpose").
92. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 148 (quoting U.S. v. Taylor, 585 F Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 1984), rev'd, 752 E2d
757 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 141, 151-52 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
Thus, a later Court interpreted Taylor as justifying state laws that discriminate against out-of-state
goods when there are "safety or health reason[s] unique" to the out-of-state goods. Or. Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich.
Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 367 (1992) (striking down a state law discriminating against out-
of-state waste but noting that the "conclusion would be different if the imported waste raised health or
other concerns not presented by [in-state] waste"); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 348
(1992) (striking down a state law discriminating against out-of-state wastes because they posed "no
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If Maine's statute served a legitimate purpose, then state laws regulating
ballast water discharges to address invasive species do as well. Like the
parasites that presented unique threats to native species in Taylor,99 only
nonnative ballast water contains nonnative invasive species that pose unique
environmental threats to a state's waters. Native species are part of the natu-
ral ecosystem and therefore do not bring about the problems wrought by
invasive species. Numerous studies have found that most of the invasive
species in the Great Lakes, including the astronomically expensive zebra
mussel, are directly attributable to the discharge of ballast water from
oceangoing vessels.' °° On the other hand, the ballast water from nonocean-
going vessels should contain only species that are native to the Great Lakes
region and that are, by definition, not invasive species. Thus, as in Taylor,
states that pass ballast water laws have legitimate "reason[s], 'apart from
the[] origin' ",,0 of out-of-state ballast water to treat such ballast water dif-
ferently.
Indeed, the argument for upholding state laws addressing invasive spe-
cies is much stronger today than it was when the Court decided Taylor,
because there is no longer any doubt that invasive species pose a serious
threat to waterbodies and the native species that inhabit them.' 2 In the
twenty years since Taylor, scientists have amassed a large amount of data
proving that those environmental risks are clearly not negligible.' °3 Non-
native species indeed threaten native populations and cause billions of
dollars worth of damage to local economies.' °4 Further, because state ballast
water laws do not aim to benefit the regulating state's economy at the
unique threat"); Taylor, 477 U.S. at 149 n.19 ("Even overt discrimination against interstate trade
may be justified where, as in this case, out-of-state goods or services are particularly likely for
some reason to threaten the health and safety of a State's citizens or the integrity of its natural re-
sources... ").
99. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
100. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. For an example of how the term "oceangoing"
is defined with reference to the Great Lakes, see supra text accompanying note 49.
101. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 152 (quoting Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627). The Philadelphia Court
struck down a state law banning the importation of out-of-state waste because there was no "reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627, 629. Also, although
this Note will not attempt to address the intricacies of quarantine laws, it is worth noting that the
Philadelphia Court stated that "quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist
measures, even though they were directed against out-of-state commerce." Id. at 628. Justice
Rehnquist's forceful dissent seized upon this language as support for upholding state laws that ban
the importation of waste. See id. at 631-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although the majority re-
jected this argument in the context of out-of-state waste, invasive species-which have the ability to
spread far and wide-arguably present a much closer analogy to those substances that justified
discriminatory quarantine laws. Indeed, Justice Thomas wrote a more recent dissenting opinion that
cited Taylor (which upheld a state ban on certain nonnative species) as an example of the proposi-
tion announced as long ago as 1888 "that States can prohibit the importation of 'cattle or meat or
other provisions that are diseased or decayed, or otherwise . . . unfit for human use or consump-
tion."' Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 620 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 489 (1888)).
102. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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expense of out-of-state interests, they are not clouded by "what the [Taylor]
Court of Appeals took to be signs of protectionist intent."' '° Because state
ballast water laws make it more difficult for the regulating state to export its
own in-state goods,' °6 these laws cannot be characterized as economic pro-
tectionism and are therefore less susceptible to the claim that they aim at an
illegitimate local purpose. The only purpose of state ballast water laws is to
prevent the introduction and spread of invasive species, a purpose that Tay-
lor held to be legitimate.
0 7
2. The Purpose Behind State Ballast Water Laws Could Not
Be Served as Well by Nondiscriminatory Means
Because state ballast water laws serve a legitimate local purpose, they
will survive a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, even if discriminatory
in nature, so long as nondiscriminatory means could not achieve a similar
result. Os Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine demands that states refrain
from burdening interstate commerce to promote a legitimate local purpose if
"alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without dis-
criminating against interstate commerce."'0 9
It is difficult to imagine alternatives that would prevent the introduction
of invasive species. Although the U.S. Coast Guard currently requires ships
to undergo open-ocean ballast water exchange before discharging any bal-
last water, " ° numerous studies have found that such exchanges do not
105. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the argument that Maine
had enacted its prohibition on live baitfish to encourage a local market for live baitfish. Id. at 150.
106. See supra Section I.A.2.
107. Taylor, 477 U.S at 151 (upholding the district court's finding that Maine's law to keep
out nonnative species and parasites "serves legitimate local purposes").
108. See id.
109. Id. at 146 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
110. 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510(a) (2006). These regulations list three options, the first of which
describes open-ocean exchange:
(1) Carry out an exchange of ballast water on the waters beyond the EEZ [Exclusive Economic
Zone], from an area more than 200 nautical miles from any shore, and in waters more than
2,000 meters (6,560 feet, 1,093 fathoms) deep, prior to entry into the Snell Lock, at Massena,
New York, or prior to navigating on the Hudson River, north of the George Washington
Bridge, such that, at the conclusion of the exchange, any tank from which ballast water will be
discharged contains water with a minimum salinity level of 30 parts per thousand.
(2) Retain the vessel's ballast water on board the vessel. If this method of ballast water man-
agement is employed, the COTP may seal any tank or hold containing ballast water on board
the vessel for the duration of the voyage within the waters of the Great Lakes or the Hudson
River, north of the George Washington Bridge.
(3) Use an alternative environmentally sound method of ballast water management that has
been submitted to, and approved by, the Commandant prior to the vessel's voyage. Requests
for approval of alternative ballast water management methods must be submitted to the Com-
mandant (G-M), U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, DC
20593-0001.
Id. Because the U.S. Coast Guard has not yet approved of any alternative treatment methods, see,
e.g., Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Brief at 8, Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL
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prevent the discharge of aquatic nuisance species."' Moreover, as in Taylor,
there are no standardized techniques for determining whether a particular
vessel carries invasive species. '
The Taylor Court held that a lack of alternatives in that case justified an
all-out ban." 3 Alternative measures, such as standardized inspection tech-
niques, had "not yet been devised."' 14 Thus, Maine's "legitimate local
purposes ... could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory
alternatives." ' This reasoning would support state laws requiring a "zero
discharge standard," meaning that ships could only discharge ballast water if
they used a treatment method that killed all invasive species. Because no
treatment methods can currently meet a zero discharge standard, ' 6 requiring
such a standard would effectively ban all discharges of ballast water in the
regulating state's ports. Nevertheless, such a ban would be no different than
the Maine statute that survived constitutional challenges in Taylor."7 More-
over, a recent report on ballast water discharges concluded that based on
current information the only level of discharges that will definitely prevent
the introduction of aquatic nuisance species is zero."18 Until someone proves
that a more relaxed standard would protect a state's waters from invasive
species, a state "is not required to develop new and unproven means of pro-
tection at an uncertain cost"" 9 and can therefore justify an outright ban on
ballast water discharges. Because even an outright ban on ballast water dis-
charges would be a justified means for preventing the spread of invasive
species, less burdensome means must also be justified.'2
2336072 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007), open-ocean exchange currently remains the only option (out-
side of an emergency discharge for safety reasons) that is available to shippers who wish to
discharge ballast water, see 33 C.FR. § 151.1510(a).
111. See sources cited supra note 20.
112. M. FALKNER ET AL., CAL. STATE LANDS COMM'N, REPORT ON PERFORMANCE STAN-
DARDS FOR BALLAST WATER DISCHARGES IN CALIFORNIA WATERS 4 (2006), available at http://
ucce.ucdavis.edu/files/filelibrary/5802/25917.pdf ("Barriers to furthering ballast water treatment
technology include: the lack of protocols for testing and evaluating performance... .
113. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
114. Id. at 150.
115. ld. at 151.
116. See, e.g., M. FALKNER ET AL., CAL. STATE LANDS COMM'N, supra note 112, at 35
("[T]he achievability of a zero discharge standard may not be possible at this time."). The California
Commission set a goal of reaching a zero discharge standard by 2020. Id. at iii.
117. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 132.
118. M. FALKNER ET AL., CAL. STATE LANDS COMM'N, supra note 112, at iii.
119. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 147.
120. For instance, Michigan has banned the discharging of untreated ballast water. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution proclaims federal laws
to be "the supreme Law of the Land." 2 ' A state is preempted from enacting
laws that are incompatible with legitimate federal laws. Preemption can oc-
cur in one of three ways. First, a state law is preempted if Congress has
passed a statute that explicitly states that it preempts any state law address-
ing the same issue.12 Second, even if Congress has not explicitly included
preemption language in a statute, a state law is preempted if one or more
federal laws make it clear that Congress has "implicitly intended to occupy
the field."' 124 Third, a state law is preempted if "it actually conflicts with" a
federal law. '2 This last type of preemption-conflict preemption-is further
subdivided into situations where it is physically impossible to comply with
both sets of laws and situations where complying with state law would frus-
trate the purposes of federal law.
2 6
This Part argues that federal regulation of onboard equipment does not
automatically preempt state ballast water laws that regulate the equipment
ships must use to treat ballast water. Section II.A briefly notes that federal
laws do not explicitly preempt states from regulating onboard treatments of
ballast water. Section II.B argues that Congress has not implicitly occupied
the field and concludes that federal law allows states to preapprove certain
methods for treating ballast water. Finally, Section II.C argues that state bal-
last water laws should also survive the conflict preemption analysis.
A. Explicit Preemption
Federal law does not explicitly preempt states from enacting ballast wa-
ter laws. Whenever Congress enacts a valid federal law, "Congress may
explicitly define the extent to which [the federal law] intends to preempt
state law."'' 27 This is known as explicit preemption, and it prevents states
from enacting laws addressing the issues that Congress has decided to regu-
late exclusively at the federal level.12 Although Congress has addressed the
121. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
122. Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469
(1984).
123. Id.
124. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
127. Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n, 467 U.S. at 469.
128. For instance, when Congress passed the Endangered Species Act, Congress explicitly
preempted states by legislating that "[a]ny State law ... is void to the extent that it may effectively
(1) permit what is prohibited by this chapter ... , or (2) prohibit what is authorized pursuant to an
exemption or permit provided for in this chapter or in any regulation which implements this chap-
ter." 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (2000) (emphasis added). This passage is also illustrative of Congress's
ability to refine the area that is preempted-in this part of the Endangered Species Act, Congress's
explicit preemption only applies to state laws that are less protective than federal laws, whereas
states are free to pass laws that are more protective: "Any State law ... may be more restrictive than
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issue of aquatic nuisance species twice (once in 1990 and again in 1996), it
has failed in both instances to include express preemption language. 2 9 In
fact, the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
1990 ("NANPCA"), as amended by the Nonindigenous Invasive Species Act
of 1996 ("NISA"), included a saving clause that explicitly recognized the
ability of states to pass their own laws to address this issue:
All actions taken by Federal agencies in implementing the provisions of
section 4722 of this title shall be consistent with all applicable Federal,
State, and local environmental laws. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the
authority of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce
control measures for aquatic nuisance species, or diminish or affect the ju-
risdiction of any State over species of fish and wildlife. 30
The saving clause makes it clear that Congress did not explicitly preempt
states here.
B. Occupation of the Field Preemption
Federal law does not occupy the field of ballast water regulations. Al-
though Congress has not explicitly preempted state laws regulating ballast
water, a state law is still preempted if one or more federal laws make it clear
that Congress has "implicitly intended to occupy the field."'' If Congress
passed valid laws that demonstrated intent to have exclusive power to regu-
late in this area, courts would likely strike down state laws addressing the
same matters, even if the state laws filled in gaps that federal laws left open.
Courts are most likely to find federal preemption in fields where Congress
has passed comprehensive federal regulations, where there is great need for
uniform federal regulations, and where Congress has a history of regulating
the field at the federal level. 3 2 Similarly, courts are most likely to allow state
regulations in fields where Congress has left large gaps, where there is no
need for national uniformity, and where states have a history of regulating
the field.
This Section contends that federal law allows states to preapprove cer-
tain methods for treating ballast water. Section 11.B.1 argues that federal law
does not preempt state ballast water laws that focus on discharges. Section
II.B.2 concedes that under existing precedent federal law would preempt
the exemptions or permits provided for in this chapter...." Id.; see also DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW 1290-91 (2002) (describing this part of the Endangered Species Act as
creating a floor, but not necessarily a ceiling).
129. 16 U.S.C. § 4701-4751 (2000) (codifying the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1990, as amended by the Nonindigenous Invasive Species Act of 1996).
130. 16 U.S.C. § 4725.
131. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added);
see also Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. at 248 ("If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given
field, any state law falling within that field is pre-empted.").
132. Chevron, 726 E2d at 486. Other factors include "consideration of state police power"




state ballast water laws that prescribe the only type of equipment that ships
can use to treat ballast water. Finally, Section II.B.3 argues that this limited
area of federal preemption does not prevent states from passing ballast water
laws that preapprove specific equipment and methods for treating ballast
water.
1. Federal Law Does Not Preempt State Ballast Water Laws
that Focus on Discharges
Federal law does not preempt state ballast water laws that focus on regu-
lating the discharges of oceangoing vessels. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Hammond, the Ninth Circuit held that federal laws did not preempt an
Alaska statute regulating ballast water discharges of oil tankers.1 3 ' The state
statute at issue in Chevron banned the discharge of ballast water that had
been stored in an oil tank.3 4 The statute noted that oily ballast water must be
brought to "an onshore ballast water treatment facility and may not be dis-
charged into the waters of the state."'35 U.S. Coast Guard regulations, on the
other hand, allowed the discharge of ballast water that contained small
amounts of oil residue, since the Coast Guard considered such ballast water
to be "clean.', 136 The Alaska legislature passed its more restrictive law be-
cause it did not believe that the federal government was doing enough to
protect Alaska's waters from the oil that mixes with ballast water held in oil
cargo tanks: "even the small amount of oil contained in ballast meeting the
federal definition of 'clean' causes harm to the Alaskan marine environ-
ment." 3 7 Although second-guessing of federal laws by the states is normally
a violation of the Supremacy Clause, the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska was
not preempted from regulating in this area. 3 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that "Congress did not implicitly intend to occupy the field of regulating
discharges of pollutants from tankers into a state's territorial waters."'
' 39
The lack of a need for uniformity weighs heavily in favor of allowing
states to regulate this area. Of the three factors that courts look to when de-
termining whether Congress intended to occupy the field,14° the Ninth
Circuit focused on whether a need for uniformity existed that would moti-
vate Congress to want to preempt states from passing their own regulations.
The court found that "there is no need for strict uniformity in regulating pol-
133. Id. at 501.
134. Id. at 485.
135. Id. at 485 n.l (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.750(e) (1976)) (emphasis omitted).
136. Id. at 485-86. Significantly, these particular regulations applied only to oil tankers, and
the term "clean" was only intended to mean that the ballast water vas relatively free of oil residue.
See id. Thus, these regulations were not in any way an attempt to regulate aquatic nuisance species.
137. Id. at 486.
138. Id. at 501.
139. Id. at 495.
140. See supra text accompanying note 132.
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lutant discharges into the territorial waters."' 4' It distinguished Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 42 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal Ports and
Waterways Safety Act of 1972 preempted state laws in the field of regulating
the design requirements of oil tankers. 43 he Ray Court reasoned that "Con-
gress intended uniform national standards for design and construction of
tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state
requirements."'" According to the Chevron court, the preemption analysis of
Ray only applied to "ship design and construction standards[, which] are mat-
ters for national attention."'' 4' Environmental regulations concerning ocean
pollutant discharges, "on the other hand, [have] long been regarded by the
Court as particularly suited to local regulation."'
46
The Chevron court also found that the CWA expressed congressional in-
tent to allow state ballast water laws to supplement federal laws because the
area was not one that needed uniformity:
Congress has indicated emphatically that there is no compelling need for
uniformity in the regulation of pollutant discharges ....
While design standards need to be uniform nationwide so that vessels
do not confront conflicting requirements in different ports and so that the
Coast Guard can promote international consensus on design standards,
there is no corresponding dominant national interest in uniformity in the
area of coastal environmental regulation. Here, in fact, the local commu-
nity is more likely competent than the federal government to tailor
environmental regulation to the ecological sensitivities of a particular
147
area.
Because local regulation is preferable here, and there is no need for uni-
formity, federal law should not preempt state ballast water laws.
The CWA also supports allowing state ballast water laws because of "con-
gressional intent that there be collaborative federal/state efforts to protect the
marine environment."' 48 If Congress intentionally set up a collaborative regu-
latory system, it could not have intended for the federal government to have
exclusive control over the field. The Ninth Circuit found evidence of congres-
sional intent for collaborative federal/state efforts to reduce water pollution in
141. Chevron, 726 F.2d at 495.
142. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
143. Ray, 435 U.S. at 173-78.
144. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
145. Chevron, 726 F.2d at 488 (quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 166 n.15).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 491-93 (citation omitted). For an interesting empirical analysis of how local varia-
tions (such as membership in the Sierra Club) have a significant effect on the enforcement of CWA
violations, see Eric Helland, Environmental Protection in the Federalist System: The Political Econ-
omy of NPDES Inspections, 36 EcON. INQUIRY 305, 311-13 (1998).
148. Chevron, 726 F.2d at 486.
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the CWA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). 49
Under the NPDES program, "the states maintain primary responsibility for
abating pollution in their jurisdictions; they have authority to establish and
administer their own permit systems and to set standards stricter than the
federal ones."'"5 Similarly, the CWA affirms that Congress intended "to rec-
ognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution."'' These provisions of the CWA
led the Ninth Circuit to conclude that "Congress has clearly expressed its
intent to allow the states to take an active role in abating water pollution."'
5 2
This reasoning suggests that federal laws should not preempt state laws that
focus on regulating discharges from vessels into state waters.
Although Chevron was decided before NISA and NANPCA, those later
statutes only bolster the argument that Congress intended to leave room for
state regulations in the field of ballast water discharges. Indeed, NANPCA's
saving clause, which recognizes the authority of states to pass their own
control measures, arguably encourages states to pass laws that supplement
the federal regulations.' Even the U.S. Coast Guard, which is in charge of
implementing NANPCA and would likely prefer an exclusively federal ap-
proach to regulating ballast water discharges, has interpreted NANPCA's
saving clause as "allow[ing] for states to develop their own ... prevention
measures."'
54
Even when Congress has not sanctioned state regulation in a particular
area, state interests can play a role in how courts decide to handle a preemp-
tion case, 55 and states undoubtedly have a strong interest in protecting their• 56
waterways and fisheries from invasive species. When states have such
strong interests in a particular field, courts may infer congressional intent to
sanction states' individual regulations. Although congressional intent theo-
retically supersedes all other interests,' 5 courts have broad discretion when
149. Id. at 489 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) ("[It was] Congress' intent
that, within three miles of shore, the protection of the marine environment should be a collaborative
federal/state effort rather than an exclusively federal one.").
150. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1370).
151. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
152. Id.
153. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (citing NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4725 (2000)).
154. Ballast Water Management for Vessels Entering the Great Lakes That Declare No Ballast
Onboard, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,831, 51,832 (Aug. 31, 2005).
155. See Chevron, 726 F2d at 486 (referring to "consideration of state police power" as a
relevant factor); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
376-79 (2d ed. 2002).
156. See supra Section I.C. 1.
157. E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 155, at 377 n.6. Interestingly, federal Indian law juris-
prudence, on the other hand, has explicitly recognized a role for state interests in the preemption
analysis:
[Olur cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to preempt State law as the
sole touchstone.... State jurisdiction is preempted by the operation of federal law if it inter-
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attempting to discern such intent, and, in the absence of explicit preemption,
the tests for field occupation and frustration of Congress's purpose often do
not yield obvious answers."' For instance, in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,5 9 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a California law imposing a moratorium on building
nuclear power plants."' ° The Court noted two things: (1) "the Federal Gov-
ernment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns;"'' 6 and
(2) California was prohibiting the construction of new nuclear plants "until
its safety concerns [were] satisfied." 62 This seemed like a straightforward
case of federal preemption, and, indeed, the Court noted that a "state mora-
torium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely
within the prohibited field."'163 Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to search
for a "nonsafety rationale"' r and found one in California's "avowed eco-
nomic purpose.' '165 The Court parsed out this economic purpose, and,
without inquiry into whether it was "California's true motive," accepted it as
grounds for upholding the state law.' 66 In doing so, the Pacific Gas and Elec-
tric Court exemplified the enormous amount of flexibility and discretion
inherent in the preemption test. This discretion helps courts uphold state
laws against preemption challenges when such laws address crucial state
interests, as state ballast water laws do.
2. Federal Law Preempts State Ballast Water Laws that Prescribe the
Only Type of Onboard Equipment Ships Can Use
Although NANPCA's saving clause bolsters the argument that Congress
intended to allow states to supplement federal laws regulating ballast water
discharges, existing precedent still prevents states from passing laws that
prescribe the only type of equipment ships can use. The Ray Court struck
down state laws that the Court found to be preempted by the Ports and Wa-
terways Safety Act of 1972,167 a federal law that also contained a saving
feres or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the
State interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority.
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983) (emphasis added).
158. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 155, at 377-78.
159. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
160. Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 216.
161. Id. at 212 (emphasis added). The Court qualified this statement by noting an exception
for instances where Congress had "expressly ceded" powers to the state, such as the regulation of
radioactive air pollutants. Id. at 212 & n.25. Those instances were not applicable to the case at hand.
See id.
162. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 213.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 216.
166. Id.
167. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 173-78 (1978).
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clause specifically allowing states "to impose additional liability or addi-
tional requirements.' ' 68 Moreover, in United States v. Locke, the Supreme
Court revisited and reaffirmed most of the analysis in Ray, and the Court
warned against placing "more weight on the saving clauses than those pro-
visions can bear."'
69
If state ballast water laws prescribe the only type of equipment that can
be used on ships, an area that has a strong need for uniformity, those laws
would likely be as doomed as the state laws that the Supreme Court stuck
down in Locke. It would be difficult to argue that NANPCA's saving clause
expresses Congressional intent "to disrupt national uniformity in all of these
matters."'' 0 The Locke Court emphasized the need for "uniformity of
regulation for maritime commerce"'' and found that federal laws regulating
oil tankers expressed a "congressional desire of achieving uniform,
international standards."'' 72 Even the Chevron court noted that vessel design
and traffic safety are "international matters," and states cannot regulate in
this area of "exclusively federal concerns.' 73 The Supreme Court has held
that design and construction standards "could not properly be left to the
diverse action of the States" because each state might pass its own particular
set of rules and thereby create different standards. 74 Thus, "only the Federal
Government .may regulate the 'design, construction, alteration, repair,
maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning' of
tanker vessels."'' 75 Although this list only applies to "tanker vessels," since
the Ray and Locke decisions assessed only the preemptive effect of federal
laws regulating oil tankers, courts could easily analogize the holdings of
these cases to state laws regulating the "equipping" of any cargo ship.
This broad language giving the federal government exclusive control
over the equipping of tanker vessels is probably the greatest threat to state
laws that regulate ballast water discharges by specifying the type of onboard
equipment that cargo vessels must use to treat ballast water. Listing ap-
proved treatment methods and specifying how these treatments must be
done opens a state to legal challenges that it is regulating the "equipping"-
and maybe also the operation-of cargo ships, when this might be a field
that "only the Federal Government may regulate.' 76 For example, before
Michigan released a General Permit that lists four specific treatment meth-
168. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994) quoted in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000).
169. Locke, 529 U.S. at 105.
170. Id. at 106.
171. Id. at 108.
172. Id. at 110 (quoting Ray, 435 U.S. at 168) (emphasis added); see also Ray, 435 U.S. at
166 n. 15 ("[S]hip design and construction standards are matters for national attention.").
173. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,493 (9th Cir. 1984).
174. Ray, 435 U.S. at 166 n.15 (quoting Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 15
(1937).




ods and how they must be carried out,'7" lawyers for the shipping industry
submitted comments analogizing between the laws and regulations
Michigan passed and the state laws struck down in Ray and Locke.7 " These
similarities give the shipping industry a strong argument 'hat, as in Ray, this
is an area that "could not properly be left to the diverse action of the
States."
79
Unlike regulations that focus on the discharges of vessels, an area where
Congress has expressed an intent to allow "collaborative federal/state ef-
fort[s],1'80 state laws like those that Michigan has adopted might appear to
tread upon an area of "exclusively federal concerns.""'8 In addition to the
need for uniformity in this area, this is "an area where the federal interest
has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and is now well es-
tablished."'' 8 2 Thus, some of the traditional factors, such as the need for
uniformity and the history of regulation in the field, arguably point toward
federal preemption of state regulation that prescribes the only type of
equipment that shipping vessels can use.
3. Federal Law Does Not Preempt State Ballast Water Laws that Specify the
Equipment that is Preapproved Under a General Permit
Although state laws cannot prescribe the only type of equipment that
cargo ships must use when operating in that state's waters, states are not
preempted from doing what Michigan has done-namely, specifying the
equipment that is preapproved under a General Permit. The Ray Court, for
example, upheld a Washington state law requiring vessels to receive a tug-
escort if they could not meet the state's design requirements.'83 The Court
ultimately determined that the "overall effect" of the law did not force
shippers to make specific design changes.' s4 The Court noted that
177. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
178. Compare Letter from Kenneth C. Gold, Partner, Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn
LLP, to Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality (July 27, 2006) ("[W]hat would happen to interstate and in-
ternational shipping if Michigan requires system 'x,' Wisconsin demands system 'y,' and Ontario
insists on system z'?"), with Ray, 435 U.S. at 166 n.15 ("The State of Washington might prescribe
standards, designs, equipment and rules of one sort, Oregon another, California another, and so on."
(quoting Kelly, 302 U.S. at 15)).
179. Ray, 435 U.S. at 166 n.15 (quoting Kelly, 302 U.S. at 15); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at
Ill ("Congress has left no room for state regulation of these matters.").
180. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483,489 (9th Cir. 1984).
181. Id. at 493. But see infra Section II.B.3 for an explanation of why a more in-depth look
reveals that federal law does not preempt Michigan's regulatory scheme.
182. Locke, 529 U.S. at 99; accord id. at 108 ("Congress has legislated in the field [of mari-
time commerce] from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal statutory and
regulatory scheme."). When the Fednav court recently looked at this issue, it also found that state
ballast water laws such as those passed by Michigan "strongly bear[] upon interstate and foreign
maritime commerce" and therefore do not receive any presumption against preemption. Fednav, Ltd.
v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).
183. Ray, 435 U.S. at 179.
184. ld. at 180.
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Washington's law was not an indirect method to force shippers to meet the
state's design requirements because tanker operators likely would choose to
rely on tug-escorts rather than undergo significantly more expensive design
changes.185 Although state ballast water laws are more likely to lead shippers
to make design changes, since other options (such as stopping discharging
altogether) are more costly than the tug-boat option in Ray, these laws do
provide other viable options. As long as the equipment specifications in
state ballast laws only apply to those oceangoing vessels that wish to seek
preapproval under a General Permit, vessels can elect either of the following
options to avoid the equipment requirements specified in the General
Permit: (1) find ways to avoid discharging any ballast water, s6 or (2) seek
individual permits for whatever equipment they prefer to use. Because these
options allay the fear expressed by the Ray court that a state could force
shippers to undergo specific equipment changes, 87 states are not preempted
from specifying the equipment that is preapproved under a General Permit.1
s
185. Id. at 173 n.25.
186. For one explanation of how ships could use existing technologies to coordinate the load-
ing and unloading of cargo to avoid discharging ballast water, see Transport Desgagns, Inc., supra
note 60. It is also not unreasonable to suggest that proper incentives could lead the shipping industry
to develop new technologies that would allow cargo ships to avoid discharging ballast water. For
instance, when Alaska banned the discharging of ballast water contaminated by oil, see supra notes
134-137 and accompanying text, this created an incentive for the shipping industry to find and use
technologies that would allow oil to be stored in ballast water tanks without polluting any of the
ballast water stored in the same tanks. At least one type of system--the dual membrane system,
which uses "stretchable membranes" to separate oil from water within the tanks-was already avail-
able at the time. Cargo/ballast Separation by Dual Membrane Sys., U.S. Patent No. 3,943,873 (filed
Mar. 18, 1974) (issued Mar. 16, 1976).
187. While individual permits would require shippers to undergo equipment changes of some
kind, the Supreme Court has previously upheld local laws limiting the amount of smoke that ships can
emit even though "[sltructural alterations would be required in order to insure compliance." See Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 441, 448 (1960). Thus, the Ray Court could not
have meant to preclude states from ever requiring shippers to undergo some form of design and equip-
ment changes. Rather, the Ray Court was primarily concerned with the possibility that each state might
force shippers to abide by a whole host of inconsistent laws. See supra text accompanying note 174.
The Supreme Court expressed a similar concern in the Dormant Commerce Clause context when it
struck down an Illinois mudflap law that directly conflicted with an existing Arkansas law. See Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 527, 530 (1959). The Illinois law would have required truck-
ers to stop at the border and spend two to four hours attaching the specific mudflaps that Illinois
required. Id. at 527. State ballast water laws avoid these concerns by allowing shippers to comply with
every state's laws either by not discharging ballast water at all or by applying for an individual permit
for a system that will meet the standards of the strictest state laws.
188. These options (avoiding discharging of ballast water or seeking individual permits to use
different equipment) also help address the concern that state ballast water laws might have imper-
missible extraterritorial effects. In Locke, the Supreme Court implied that it would not look
favorably upon state laws that have extraterritorial effects "requiring [a] tanker to modify its primary
conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule." United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112 (2000). Michigan's ballast water laws arguably fit into this category be-
cause they list several treatments that could require shippers to take measures while outside of
Michigan's jurisdiction. See GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 28, at 4 (requiring a nineteen hour hold-
ing time for hypochlorite treatment); id. at 7 (requiring a twenty-four hour holding time for chlorine
dioxide treatment); id. at II (requiring a forty-eight hour holding time for deoxygenation treatment);
see also id. at 9 (requiring ultraviolet radiation treatment to occur both upon discharging and upon
taking in ballast water). Indeed, the Fednav court has recently acknowledged that Michigan's Gen-




State ballast water laws should also survive the conflict preemption
analysis. When Congress has not occupied the field-explicitly or implic-
itly-states are free to pass laws that supplement the federal regulatory
regime,'8 9 unless such laws "actually conflict[] with federal law."' 90 Actual
conflict-also known as conflict preemption--occurs where "it is impossi-
ble to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."'9' Because it is possible to comply with state ballast water laws
and federal laws, and because such laws do not frustrate congressional pur-
poses, these laws should survive the conflict preemption analysis.
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Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007 WL 2336072, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007). Nevertheless, because
ships can avoid discharging or seek individual permits for treatments that could occur without any
extraterritorial effects, these concerns are not as worrisome as they at first appear. Further, a ship
could meet its minimum holding times while in the regulating state's ports. Although this would
slow down the shipping process, it would be justifiable because even the more extreme step of an
all-out ban on discharges is justifiable here. See supra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 575
(2007) ("Absent field preemption, state legislatures are typically permitted to supplement the federal
regime by, for example, imposing requirements on regulated entities above and beyond what federal
law requires."). Professor Seinfeld uses the word "typically" to indicate that "states might be prohib-
ited from supplementing a federal regulatory scheme, if doing so would 'frustrate the purpose' of
the federal scheme." Id. at 575 n. 117. For a discussion of whether state ballast water laws frustrate
of purpose of the federal scheme, see infra Section II.C.2.
190. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (emphasis added).
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. The Fednav court recently held in accordance with this view, although its treatment of
the issue was somewhat cursory compared to the issues explored in this Section. See Fednav, 2007
WL 2336072, at * I1. The Fednav court also failed to note that the only situation in which conflict
preemption might arise would be if a state approved specific treatments that ran counter to federal
regulation in this area. Specifically, state laws allowing the use of biocides arguably conflict with the
federal requirement that any alternative ballast water treatment system be an "environmentally
sound method ... approved by[] the [Coast Guard] Commandant." 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510(a)(3)
(2006). Federal law defines "'environmentally sound' methods" as methods that "emphasize ...
nonchemical measures." NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4702(6) (2000). Thus, those portions of state ballast
water laws that allow treatment methods using biocides that are obviously chemical measures, see,
e.g., GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 28, at 4-8 (permitting the use of hypochlorite treatment and
chlorine dioxide treatment), may be in conflict with federal law and may not survive a preemption
analysis. Of course, these portions should be easily severable from the rest of the state's regulatory
scheme. Indeed, severing the approval of biocide treatments from a state's regulatory scheme would
not only prevent state ballast water laws from conflicting with federal regulation, but it would also
have the practical effect of forcing shippers to find nonchemical solutions for treating ballast water.
For reasons why chemical treatments are poor choices for treating ballast water, see Public Com-
ment Letter from Neil S. Kagan, Senior Counsel, and Kyle Landis-Marinello, Legal Intern, National
Wildlife Federation's Great Lakes Natural Resource Center, to Barry Burns, Water Bureau, Michi-
gan Department of Environmental Quality 10-17 (July 26, 2006) (on file with author) (compiling
numerous studies on the effects of chlorine dioxide and hypochlorite treatments and concluding that
these treatments are not environmentally sound).
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1. Impossible to Comply with Both State and Federal Law
State ballast water laws do not make it impossible for ships to comply
with applicable federal laws. Pursuant to NANPCA, 9 3 the U.S. Coast Guard
has promulgated regulations regarding ballast water management. 14 Specifi-
cally, the Coast Guard has mandated that cargo ships entering the Great
Lakes carrying ballast water can only discharge that water if they have either
(1) carried out a deep-water open-ocean exchange of their ballast water at
least two hundred miles away from any shore, or (2) treated the ballast wa-
ter with "an alternative environmentally sound method ... approved by[] the
[Coast Guard] Commandant."' 95 State laws addressing ballast water dis-
charges are unlikely to run afoul of the Coast Guard's regulations because a
vessel can comply with both sets of laws. For instance, a vessel could avoid
discharging ballast water, and this would clearly comply with both sets of
laws. '96 Alternatively, a vessel could do an open-ocean exchange to meet the
Coast Guard's standards and then do an additional treatment to meet the
regulating state's standards.
2. Frustration of Purposes
State ballast water laws do not frustrate the purposes of federal laws ad-
dressing the subject. The Supreme Court has noted that even when it is
physically possible to comply with state and federal law, state law is pre-
empted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' 97 Congress has given the U.S. Coast
Guard broad authority over regulating the safety of ships, and state ballast
water laws do not place any obstacles in the accomplishment of that purpose
because nothing in these state laws will detract from-or interfere with-the
U.S. Coast Guard's authority.'98
Although state ballast water laws force vessels to do more than what the
federal government has required them to do, NANPCA's saving clause rec-
ognized the need for state laws to augment the federal scheme.' 99 Professor
Jose Fernandez has noted that federal environmental laws often provide only
193. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4751 (2000).
194. 33 C.ER. §§ 151.1500-2065 (2006). For the full version of this regulation, see supra
note 110.
195. 33 C.ER. § 151.1510(a) (2006).
196. See supra notes 60, 186 and accompanying text for an explanation of why this is not an
unreasonable suggestion.
197. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
198. See supra Section H.C. 1. State ballast water laws are only concerned with what leaves
ships when they choose to discharge ballast into state waters. Thus, these laws are nowhere near the
affront to U.S. Coast Guard authority that was at issue in Ray and Locke, where state laws explicitly
aimed at preventing shipwrecks and thereby questioned the efficacy of the Coast Guard's safety
regulations. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000) ("[T]he federal judgment that a
vessel is safe to navigate United States waters prevail[s] over the contrary state judgment." (quoting
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978))).
199. See 16 U.S.C. § 4725 (2000).
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a foundation and "generally allow[] for the enactment of more stringent
state standards. ' ° In the case of ballast water regulation, Congress intended
NANPCA, like the CWA, to be a floor rather than a ceiling.9 Thus, if any-
thing, state ballast water laws actually further the purposes of Congress by
building upon that floor.2°2 The Supreme Court has historically shown great
reluctance to find that state environmental laws such as these frustrate the
203purposes of federal legislation.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of federal regulations, states must address the issue of
ballast water discharges of invasive species, and they have broad discretion
to do so without running afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause or the Su-
premacy Clause. Although the shipping industry is likely to object to any
204
efforts to regulate ballast water discharges, something must be done to
stop this noontime dumping. Until the federal government passes compre-
hensive regulations to prevent the spread of invasive species, it is up to the
states to pass such laws.
State ballast water laws do not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and, even if they did, such laws would be justified by the benefits they bring
and should therefore survive any Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
Professor Eric T. Freyfogle has noted that in general "environmental laws
generate economic benefits that exceed their costs, usually by a wide mar-
gin."20 5 By remedying market failures, environmental laws often lead to
gains in overall efficiency.2 0 Although the economic benefits and costs of
201
environmental laws are usually difficult to calculate, that is not the case
with regard to oceangoing shipping to the Great Lakes. Indeed, such calcu-
lations have already been made, and they reveal that society currently pays
208
roughly five billion dollars every year to save fifty-five million dollars.
200. Jose L. Fernandez, The Purpose Test: Shielding State Environmental Statutes From the
Sword of Preemption, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1990).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 153-154. For an explanation of why the Clean Water
Act is only a floor and therefore allows states to supplement federal regulation, see supra text ac-
companying notes 147-152.
202. The Fednav court also recently recognized that because the purpose of NANPCA is to
prevent the introduction of invasive species, "another method which is designed to protect these
waters cannot frustrate the purpose of the federal law." Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, No. 07-11116, 2007
WL 2336072, at *11 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).
203. See supra notes 155-166 and accompanying text.
204. Indeed, the shipping industry has already filed a lawsuit challenging Michigan's ballast
water laws. See Complaint, Fednav, Ltd., 2007 WL 2336072 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).
205. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WHY CONSERVATION Is FAILING AND How IT CAN REGAIN
GROUND 46 (2006).
206. Id. at 50.
207. See SAGOFF, supra note 16, at 108-10.
208. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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The lack of comprehensive federal regulation in this area allows state
ballast water laws to survive federal preemption challenges as well. Al-
though states must be careful in how they draft ballast water laws, federal
law does not preempt state laws that focus on avoiding discharges of inva-
sive species, even if such laws preapprove specific onboard equipment. If
anything, state ballast water laws further the congressional goals behind the
CWA and NANPCA, both of which encourage states to take additional
measures to protect treasured waters.
